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T H E  T R O T T E R  R E V I E W
The Brownsville, Texas, 
disturbance of 1906 and the 
Politics of Justice
Garna L. Christian 
An acrimonious civilian-military conflict reached into the halls 
of Congress and the White House when residents of Brownsville, Texas 
accused the First Battalion, 25th Infantry, of attacking the town from 
Fort Brown around midnight on August 12, 1906, claiming the life of one 
townsman and injuring two others. 
The disputed episode took place against the background 
of deteriorating racial relations in the state and region, an enhanced self-
confidence of black soldiers following heroic achievements in the Spanish-
American War and the Philippine insurrection, and the economic de-
cline of the South Texas town bordering the Rio Grande. Texas, like other 
southern states, was tightening segregation at the turn of the century. 
Brownsville, bypassed when rail joined San Antonio to Laredo, Texas in 
the late nineteenth century, failed to recover the prosperity the Civil War 
had inspired. 
Companies B, C, and D, previously stationed at Fort Niobra-
ra, Nebraska, drew the wrath of some Brownsvillians even before their 
arrival on July 28, replacing the white 26th Infantry. Complainants wired 
Washington of their disapproval of black troops as had other Texas 
garrison towns in previous years. Since 1899, expressed hostility had 
led to physical confrontations at Laredo, Rio Grande City, and El Paso. 
Threats from white Texas National Guardsmen prompted the military 
command to cancel the participation of the regiment in maneuvers at 
Camp Mabry, Austin. Federal officials, ironically, exacerbated matters. 
19 See Betsy Klimasmith, At Home in the City (Hanover: University Press 
of New England, 2005), Chapter One.
20  Hanna Wallinger, Pauline E. Hopkins: A Literary Biography (Athens: 
University of Georgia Press, 2005), p. 158.
21  Daniels, In Freedom’s Birthplace, p. 179.
22 I do not count the Smiths as members of Boston’s exclusive black 
upper class. See Adelaide M. Cromwell, The Other Brahmins (Fayetteville: 
University of Arkansas Press, 1994).
23 See Hayden, The Grand Domestic Revolution: A History of Feminist 
Designs for American Homes, Neighborhoods, and Cities (Cambridge, 
Mass.: MIT Press, 1981).
24 For historical background on urban and rural utopias in the United 
States, see Dolores Hayden, Seven American Utopias: The Architecture 
of Communitarian Socialism, 1790-1975 (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 
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President Theodore Roosevelt dispatched Maj. Augustus P. 
Blocksom, assistant inspector-general of the Southwestern Division, 
to Brownsville only days after the raid. After eleven days of inquiry, the 
officer submitted a report to the White House concurring in the guilt 
of soldiers in the garrison. Deciding that both sides had exaggerated 
the facts, Blocksom judged that Tate had probably overreacted in his 
whipping of Private Newton and that some of the citizenry were obvi-
ously racially prejudiced. Nevertheless, asserting that black soldiers had 
adopted a more aggressive stance on social equality, the major outlined 
a scenario of troop culpability. He conjectured that some soldiers began 
firing between the barracks and wall; others fired into the air to create an 
alarm, and from nine to fifteen men jumped the wall and rushed through 
an alley into the streets. The shooters subsequently returned to camp to 
clean and reassemble their weapons, while duping their officers.
 Acknowledging the failure of witnesses to identify culprits, the 
fact that some bars had served enlisted men, and that the victim Natus 
had never quarreled with troops, Blocksom held the testimony of the 
townspeople superior to that of the soldiers and based his judgment 
squarely on that testimony. In this manner he discounted the revelation 
that the discovered cartridges did not fit the recently assigned Springfield 
rifles. Blocksom recommended the discharge of all the enlisted men of 
the battalion, without option to reenlist in any military branch, if they 
refused to identify the guilty by a date determined by the War Department. 
Heeding the demands of Texans, Roosevelt ordered the First Battalion to 
Fort Reno, Oklahoma.
Texas Ranger Captain William J. “Bill” McDonald, a formidable 
critic of black garrisons, and Penrose set curious guidelines in selecting a 
dozen suspects. The list included the sentinel, scavenger, the two victims 
of physical abuse, and an eyewitness to one of the latter incidents. The 
Cameron County grand jury grudgingly abstained from entering any in-
dictments, and the War Department scheduled Fort Brown for temporary 
closure. 
Determined to uncover the guilty, Roosevelt sent Gen. Ernest A. 
Garlington, inspector general at Washington, to Fort Reno and Fort Sam 
Houston, at San Antonio, where the unindicted suspects remained. The 
president instructed Garlington to threaten the battalion with dismissal 
Inspector of customs Fred Tate pistol-whipped Pvt. James W. Newton for 
supposedly jostling Tate’s wife and another white woman on a sidewalk. 
Another customs officer, A. Y. Baker, pushed Pvt. Oscar W. Reed, whom he 
accused of drunkenness and boisterous behavior, into the river. Soldiers 
complained of racial insults directed to them in the streets.
On the evening of August 12, Mrs. Lon Evans stated that a uni-
formed black man had thrown her to the ground before he fled into the 
darkness. Mayor Frederick J. Combe met with post commander Maj. 
Charles W. Penrose to defuse the potentially explosive situation. The 
major imposed an eight o’clock curfew on his men, which appeared 
successful until shots rang out about twelve a.m. near the wall separat-
ing the fort from the town. Various residents testified to having seen a 
shadowy group of from nine to twenty persons charging through an alley 
toward town, firing several hundred shots indiscriminately or into lighted 
areas. Evidently dividing into two sections, the raiders mortally wounded 
bartender Frank Natus and shot the horse from under police Lieutenant 
Joe Dominguez, shattering the man’s arm, which required amputation. A 
bullet grazed bookbinder Paulino Preciado, barely missing other bystand-
ers. Witnesses insisted the raiders were soldiers, some claiming to have 
seen them and others describing the shots as reports from military rifles. 
Townsmen were unable to identify any culprits individually.
Conversely, the soldiers m aintained their innocence. Pvt. Joseph 
Howard, guarding the area closest to the wall, and Matias Tamayo, post 
scavenger, assumed the garrison was under attack, a belief shared by Ma-
jor Penrose until confronted by Mayor Combe. A roll call of troops found 
all present or accounted for, and an inspection of weapons and ammuni-
tion noted none missing. A search of the fort uncovered no spent shells, 
discarded cartridge belts, or any indication of firing from the post. After 
the morning call of the Brownsville mayor, displaying empty cartridges 
from the city streets, Penrose reversed his belief in his command’s innocence.
Many outside the fort and town shared the post commander’s 
new view. Texas newspapers reported the story with an assumption 
of guilt, most beneath sensational headlines, citing trivial incidents not 
warranting such behavior. Editors, seconded by Texas officeholders 
ranging from congressmen to Governor S. W. T. Lanham, demanded the 
withdrawal of all African-American troops from the state. 
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hold jobs in the federal civil service. Inexplicably, in 1910, the War Depart-
ment allowed 14 of the troops to reenlist, never stating its criteria for the 
selections. Courts-martial of Major Penrose and officer of the day Capt. 
Edgar Macklin, for dereliction, produced no convictions, though Macklin 
suffered gunshot wounds from an unidentified assailant after his transfer 
to Fort Reno.
No subsequent evidence came to light, but President Richard 
Nixon, acting in 1972 on a proposal by Congressman August Hawkins, 
an African-American Democrat from California, granted honorable 
discharges and a pension of $25,000 to each of the unredeemed 153 men 
of the First Battalion, without placing blame for the disturbance. The deci-
sion followed the publication of a history of the incident, The Brownsville 
Raid, by John D. Weaver, who blamed outside raiders or townsmen. Only 
one survivor, former private Dorsey Wills, benefited from the measure. 
He maintained his insistence on the innocence of the battalion until his 
death five years later.
without honor, as Blocksom had suggested, if they were uncooperative. 
When even the specter of separation could elicit no information, the 
general urged his superior to issue the order, to which Roosevelt complied 
on November 4, widening the controversy from Texas to the nation.
The post-election edict evoked particular criticism from 
the African-American community. The Richmond Planet and Atlanta 
Independent accused Roosevelt of waiting until after the congressional 
elections to assure the Republican Party won the black vote in key northern 
states. Black ministers entered the fray and rising activist W. E. B. DuBois 
urged his followers to vote Democratic in the 1908 elections. Booker T. 
Washington, the widely-publicized White House guest and the admin-
istration’s patron to the African-American constituency, stood with 
Roosevelt, sharing criticism directed at the chief executive and heir 
apparent, Secretary of War William Howard Taft. An interracial organization, 
the Constitutional League, first raised the argument of the troops’ innocence. 
Director John Milholland, a white Progressive, assailed racism, haste, and 
inconsistencies in the reports of Blocksom and Garlington. The criticism 
stung Roosevelt, who had cultivated a reputation for racial fairness since 
his military service alongside black troops in the Spanish-American War. 
From the outcry, Republican Senator Joseph B. Foraker took up the cause 
of the cashiered battalion.
Whether acting on principle, from old grudges against Roosevelt, 
or in pursuit of presidential ambitions, the Ohio conservative became the 
soldiers’ most celebrated advocate. His efforts produced a Senate inves-
tigation of the raid and a summons to the War Department seeking all 
evidence leading to its decision. Roosevelt countered with a message 
defending the summary dismissals. The Senate Committee on Military 
Affairs held hearings between February 1907 and March 1908, during 
which Foraker attacked the absence of trials and suggested that outside 
forces had raided the town. Foraker’s campaign for the soldiers failed 
in tandem with his presidential candidacy. Voting 9–4, the committee 
sustained the administration policy, while Foraker mustered only 16 del-
egate votes at the national convention against 702 for Taft. By November, 
most blacks had drifted back to the Republican Party and contributed 
to Taft’s victory. Roosevelt made only two concessions before leaving of-
fice, enabling the debarred soldiers to reapply for military service and to 
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T H E  T R O T T E R  R E V I E W
African-American Activist 
Mary Church Terrell  
and the  
Brownsville disturbance
debra Newman Ham 
I will not shrink from undertaking what seems wise 
and good because I labor under the double handicap 
of race and sex but striving to preserve a calm mind 
with a courageous, cheerful spirit, barring bitterness 
from my heart, I will struggle all the more earnestly to 
reach the goal. 
 —Mary Church Terrell  
 
 Mary Church Terrell (1863–1954) demonstrated the philosophy 
of calm courage many times in a long life of activism. In the middle of 
her life, when three companies of African-American soldiers in Browns-
ville, Texas, were dismissed without honor and without a hearing in 1906, 
she readily came to their defense. Their dismissals followed a racial distur-
bance during which one white man was killed and several others wounded 
in Brownsville. Terrell, at the urging of some African-American leaders, 
went to see Secretary of War William Howard Taft to request that the 
action against the black troops be rescinded until they received a fair 
hearing. Her request was granted after Taft appealed to President Theodore 
Roosevelt, and the Constitution League, a civil rights organization, sent in 
lawyers to hear the soldiers’ side of the story.
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